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We analyze empirical data from the internet auction site Aukro.cz. The time series of
activity shows truncated fractal structure on scales from about 1 minute to about 1 day.
The distribution of waiting times as well as the distribution of number of auctions within
fixed interval is a power law, with exponents 1.5 and 3, respectively. Possible implications
for the modeling of stock-market fluctuations are briefly discussed.
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1. Introduction
Electronic markets emerged immediately after the rise of the World-Wide Web.
The initial enthusiasm fueled by the great expectations of the “New economy” was
harshly put in its place by the “dot-com” crash in the years 2000 to 2002, but in
realistic view, electronic commerce plays indeed ever increasing role within its own
segment of economy. There is nothing that would deserve the label “New economy”,
but there are plenty of new chances where the “Old good economy” can get new
blood. Among the various incarnations of e-markets, we shall concentrate on a single
segment, namely the on-line auctions. The best-known example is the site Ebay.com,
where virtually anybody can sell and buy almost every legally accessible item. A
good deal of other services throughout the word imitate more or less successfully
the Ebay.
Despite many studies devoted to it, some aspects of e-markets still escape atten-
tion of the practitioners, perhaps because the questions are considered too academic.
However, we believe that asking fundamental, “academic” questions is beneficial for
economic practice in the long run. The agents’ activity on electronic markets has
been studied for quite a long time now [1]. Besides the analyses of overall structure
of on-line auctions [4], much attention was devoted to the problem of winning strat-
egy [11, 10, 18, 17, 15, 8] and timing of the placement of bids [2, 13, 18, 7]. The
study of network aspects of on-line auctions was initiated in the work [19] and then
it was investigated in depth [20, 5]. One of the most important questions asked was
how the agents on the network cluster spontaneously [20, 12, 9, 16, 14].
The empirical studies of “Old good economy” concentrate mainly on the amount
and quality of fluctuations of prices [6, 3]. Distribution of price changes and their
1
October 16, 2018 6:13 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE slanina140113
2 Activity in electronic auctions
correlations reveal well-known complex patterns, the so-called “stylized facts”. This
information is immediately used by speculators, so that the knowledge of them
translates directly into money.
On the other hand, fluctuations in electronic markets were much less studied.
In this work, we have in mind the fluctuations in the intensity of trading. Although
they may seem less practically relevant, they are more academically appealing.
Indeed, the complexity of the noise in e. g. the stock market, is usually understood
as a sign of complex reaction of the system of large number of interacting economic
agents on a random external input, which may be a trivial white noise. It is also
supposed that feedback effects play fundamental role and are behind the herding
and other phenomena. In short, an input, which may or may not be a Gaussian
noise, is processed in a complex way to give rise complex fluctuations seen in stock
markets.
On the contrary, the processing of random input signal is supposed much weaker
in electronic auctions. Essentially, most of the items traded are independent. It
can be also formulated as saying that the ratio of number of commodities/number
of agents is ≪ 1 at stock market, while ≫ 1 at electronic auctions. Hence, the
fluctuations are mostly due to the dynamics of decisions of quasi-independent agents
and therefore their properties can be considered fairly close to the hypothetical input
noise of the stock market.
In this work we investigate the quantity and quality of fluctuations which occur
in trading at on-line auctions. The questions asked are analogous to those well
studied within the “Old good economy”, namely the fractal nature of the time
series encoding the activity of individual agents. Similarly to the “stylized facts”
established in stock markets, we try to grasp at least some of the “stylized facts”
pertinent to electronic markets. Specifically, we shall analyze data from the site
aukro.cz, which is the Czech Republic division of the multinational Allegro group.
2. Description of the data set
Most of the studies of on-line auctions were conducted on the best-known Ebay,
or on similar huge sites. From practical point of view, less prestigious sites may be
more attractive, because they often reveal information which is hidden on Ebay and
their smaller extent enables collecting data sets which are “full” in the sense that
they cover nearly all activity on the site. We found that the site aukro.cz, acting
in the Czech Republic, has just the size we can effectively download using a single
dedicated computer.
We downloaded systematically all the information on the auctions that were
posted on the aukro.cz site, starting on 1 December 2009 and ending 18 November
2011. Due to occasional hardware and software problems the data are not absolutely
complete, but we estimate that the missing parts are not larger than a few per cent
of the existing data. In total, we have information on M = 46, 240, 059 auctions.
Among them, there were Mrea = 11, 473, 486 realized auctions, i. e those with
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Fig. 1. Histogram of average distances between consecutive auctions of the same seller. Full line
corresponds to all sellers, dashed line to sellers who initiated at least 10 auctions, dotted line
to sellers who initiated at least 100 auctions. Time is given in days. The arrows indicate the
positions of the features at 〈∆T 〉 = 1 hour, 5 minutes, 30 seconds, and the minimum measured
value 〈∆T 〉 = 1 sec.
at least one bid. Each auction has a unique seller and if realized, one or more
bidders. We have information on unique ID numbers of all sellers and bidders in
all downloaded auctions. We identified N = 1, 083, 276 agents, among them Nsel =
460, 867 distinct sellers and Nbid = 1, 004, 703 bidders. Of them, Ndouble = 382, 294
are double agents, i. e. are present both in the set of sellers and in the set of bidders.
Here we are interested in the properties of the time sequence of activity of
individual sellers. For each auction we know its ending time. In the early stages of
the project, we systematically recorded the ended auctions. With this technology,
the starting time and price is lost. Only later we started recording the auction both
at start and end. Therefore, starting time sequences we have are shorter and we do
not analyze them here.
Thus, for each member of the set of sellers we construct the sequence of ending
times of all auctions where she acted as a seller. (Note that the same could be
done also for bidders and more complicated structures can be also studied, for
example combined bidder ans seller sequences for double agents.) For the seller
a, a = 1, 2..., Nsel, we obtain the sequence of times Ti,a, i = 1, 2, ...,Ma. In all the
analysis, the unit of measurement is one day. We denotedMa the number of auctions
posted by the seller a. We found that the maximum is maxaMa = 150, 916, so that
the time sequences can be fairly long. In the following we shall denote Tmin,a = T1,a
the starting time of the sequence corresponding to the seller a, Tmax,a = TMa,a the
ending time and Tspan,a = Tmax,a−Tmin,a the entire time span covered by the series.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of distances between consecutive auctions of the same seller. The data are
summed for all time series in the data set. The unit of time is one day. The arrows indicate the
positions of the maxima at ∆T = 1 sec, 22 secs, 1 min, 5 minutes, and 1 week. The straight
line is the power-law dependence ∝ (∆T )−1.5. For ∆T > 1 day, the distribution is averaged over
intervals (∆T,∆T + 1 min), in order to see better the structure of peaks at multiples of days.
3. Analysis of the time series
When we analyze the time series of auctions, the first thing to look at is the average
density in which the auctions appear. Each seller acts with different mean frequency,
so we should ask first, what is the distribution of the average distances between
auctions 〈∆T 〉a = Tspan,a/(Ma − 1). The results are shown in Fig. 1. We can see
that most sellers act at a scale up to 1 day, with a broad tail extending up to several
hundred days, which is about the total extent of our data. So, the tail is to a large
extent determined by the finite observation time. The maximum of the distribution
lies around 〈∆T 〉 ≃ 5 minutes and it is not simple, but fairly broad an structured,
signaling several types of sellers. So, the set of sellers is very heterogeneous.
However, if we average the distances between auctions over all sellers, we get
quite a long time, about 30 days. This means that the peaks at short distances are
somehow not typical. To check this, we looked at what types of sellers constitute
these short-distance peaks. We found that mostly they are occasional sellers, who
tried to sell a chunk of items within very short time and then they never acted
again. Most of them sold at most 10 items. Among about 8000 sellers characterized
by average distance between auctions at most 10 min, we identified just 13 intense
traders, i. e. those with at least 1000 auctions. They specialized in several typical
branches, like used books (at least 4 of these 13 sellers), cosmetics, collectibles (old
postcards, fossils, etc.), bijou, and the like. To filter out the occasional sellers, we
plot in Fig. 1 also two other histograms, restricted to sellers with at least 10 and
at least 100 auctions. We can clearly see that the peaks at very small average time
distances substantially diminish in the former and vanish in the latter histogram.
But still the set of sellers with at least 100 auctions cover scales of 〈T 〉 starting at
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Fig. 3. Four typical examples of the time series of activity of sellers on the Aukro site. The numbers
1 to 4 refer to corresponding data in Figs. 4 and 5. Time is given in days, day 0 is 1 January 2009.
For better visibility, the time was shifted by the interval δt = 0 for curve 1, δt = 100 for curve 2,
δt = 300 for curve 3, and δt = 400 for curve 4.
5 minutes and ending at tens of days. This is a fairly wide range of scales.
When we look at the time series (examples will be shown soon), we observe com-
plex patterns. The first step in understanding the patterns is to see the distribution
of the distances between auctions
P (∆T ) =
∑
a
Ma−1∑
i=1
δ
(
Ta,i+1 − Ta,i −∆T
)
. (1)
(Recall that the time series belongs to a single seller, so the distance is the time
which separates the consecutive auctions of the same seller.) The distribution is
shown in Fig. 2. We can see large number of sharp peaks at special values of the
time distances. However, all of them are artifacts in the sense that they correspond
to multiples of natural units of time in which the sellers organize their activity,
namely minutes, multiples of 5 minutes, and especially multiples of days. The non-
trivial feature is rather the background decay, over which the peaks are superposed.
The data in Fig. 2 suggest that within the time scale of minutes to one day, the
background decay is a power law P (∆T ) ∼ (∆T )−γ with γ ≃ 1.5.
Let us turn to the analysis of the individual time series now. The overall impres-
sion on the time series can be glimpsed from the cumulative number of auctions for
one seller up to time t, i. e.
Nt,a =
Ma∑
i=1
θ(t− Ti,a) (2)
where θ(x) = 1 for x > 0 and θ(x) = 0 elsewhere. We show in Fig. 3 four examples
of such time series. We can see that they look rather different. Some of them appear
fairly smooth, other exhibit marked steps. Details of the same time series, covering
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Fig. 4. Details of the timeseries shown in Fig. 3, covering 10 days. The starting day was t0 = 750
for curves 1, 2, and 4, and t0 = 970 for curve 3. For better visibility, the curves were shifted
downwards by N0 = 65000, 47500, 116200, and 7600 for curves 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Time
is given in days.
interval of just 10 days is shown in Fig. 4. We can again observe steps at this smaller
scale, indicating that a structure close to a fractal is present at least in some of the
series. Among several methods of checking the fractality of the series we chose the
standard box-counting method, i. e. covering the time span of the series by intervals
of variable length.
Let us take one time series, for seller a. We fix for a moment a time interval ∆t
and divide the time span Tspan,a = Tmax,a − Tmin,a into non-overlapping intervals
of length ∆t. Then, we count the number Noccup,a(∆t) of such intervals containing
at least one auction. Of course, we do that only for ∆t < Tspan,a.
We can see in Fig. 5 the dependence Noccup,a(∆t) for the same four examples of
time series as shown in Fig 3. (We drop the index a in the axis label, as it bears no
information there.) Several regimes can be identified. At times longer than about
one day, all the four time series exhibit the behavior Noccup(∆t) ∝ (∆t)
−1, typical
for fractal dimension κ = 1. At shorter time scales, the behavior is much different
and non-universal. For example, the time series No. 2 exhibits two shoulders, at 1
day and at 1 minute. There is a clear plateau below 1 minute, showing that at such
small scales the fractal dimension is zero. Less clear “plateau” can be seen between
1 minute and 1 day, which may perhaps be better characterized as a depression at
scale about 1 hour. This suggests that two typical scales are there. The auctions are
put no closer than about 1 minute, but in bunches extending no more than about
one hour. On a scale larger than about one day, the time series looks uniform. This
is in marked contrast with time series No. 3 and No 4. At scales shorter than 1 day,
the auctions seem to form a set close to a fractal, more clear for No. 3, with fractal
dimension κ ≃ 0.25, and less clear for No. 4, with slightly larger fractal dimension.
The time series No. 1 is yet another type. Again, there are no structures in the
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Fig. 5. Number of intervals of length ∆t, containing at least one auction, for the timeseries shown
in Fig. 3. Time is given in days, arrows showing the scale of one minute and one hour. For better
visibility, the data are shifted upwards by a factor s = 1, 10, 100, and 1000, for curves 1, 2, 3, and
4, respectively. The straight lines are power dependencies ∝ (∆t)−0.25 (solid line), and ∝ (∆t)−1
(dashed lines).
time series below the scale of 1 minute and beyond 1 day the time series is uniform.
However, at the intermediate scales, there is a broad crossover, with neither a clear
separation of time scales nor any sign of fractality.
Despite the diversity of the characters of the time series we looked also on their
average properties. However, we have to be careful in making the average, for several
reasons. First, the time span of the time series varies and so varies the maximum
interval ∆t which enters into the time span. If we averaged directly the number of
occupied intervals, we would introduce a systematic error. Therefore, we average
the normalized quantity
Noccup,norm(∆t) =
(∑
a
θ(∆t− Tspan,a)
)
−1∑
a
θ(∆t− Tspan,a)
Noccup,a(∆t)
Tspan,a
. (3)
Second, we found that time sequences with too short time span or containing too
few auctions introduce spurious artifacts. Therefore, we limit the sum over a in (3)
to such series, for which time span extends more than one week, i. e. Tspan,a > 7,
and which contain at least 300 auctions, i. e. Ma ≥ 300.
The result is shown in Fig. 6. After averaging, three regimes are clearly visible.
For the scales below ∆t1 ≃ 30 seconds, the fractal dimension is zero on average,
indicating that typical time sequences contain no structure at times shorter than
∆t1. Between ∆t1 and the longer scale ∆t2 ≃ 1 day, the power-law decay suggests
fractal structure with dimension κ ≃ 0.25. On longer scales than ∆t2, the decay
follows a power law with exponent κ ≃ 0.8, somewhat lower than 1, showing some
non-trivial structure also at longer scales. This result deviates from the data shown
in Fig. 5, where all four samples are fitted to κ ≃ 1 at long time scales, but the
deviation is rather small. This indicates that some time series are structured also
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Fig. 6. Number of intervals of length ∆t, containing at least one auction, normalized to the time
span, and averaged over all timeseries in the data set longer than one week and containing at least
300 auctions. Time is given in days, arrows showing the scale of one minute and one hour. The
straight lines are power dependencies ∝ (∆t)−0.25 (solid line), and ∝ (∆t)−0.8 (dashed line).
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Fig. 7. Distribution of number of auctions Nin contained within a time interval ∆t, summed for
all time series in the data set. The six curves correspond to intervals (from the bottom to the top)
∆t = 1 sec, 10 sec, 100 sec, 103 sec, 104 sec, and 105 sec. For better visibility, the data are shifted
upwards by the factors (from the bottom to the top) s = 1, 10, 100, 103, 104, and 105. The arrows
indicate the positions of Nin = 25, 50, and 75, to stress that these are just the positions of the
first peaks. The straight line is the power-law dependence ∝ N−3
in
.
at larger times, but it is not common.
The box counting method used above does not reveal all the complexity. A com-
plementary method consists in plotting distribution of number of auctions present
within an interval of fixed length. We divide the time span into intervals (tl,a, tl+1,a),
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Fig. 8. Distribution of number of auctions Nin,rel contained within a time interval ∆t = k〈∆T 〉,
where 〈∆T 〉 is the average distance between consecutive auctions in the same time series. The data
are summed for all time series in the data set. The four curves correspond to multiples (from the
bottom to the top) k = 1, 10, 100 and 1000. For better visibility, the data are shifted upwards by
the factors (from the bottom to the top) s = 1, 10, 103, and 106. The straight line is the power-law
dependence ∝ N−3
in,rel
.
tl,a = Tmin,a + l∆t for 0 ≤ l < Tspan,a/∆t and count
P (Nin) =
∑
a
∑
k
δ
(
Ma∑
i=1
θ(Ti,a − tl,a)θ(tl+1,a − Ti,a)−Nin
)
. (4)
The results are shown in Fig. 7 for intervals of lengths ∆t = 10n seconds, n =
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. We can see that all these interval lengths lead to the same general
form of the distribution, with a tail following a power law P (Nin) ∼ N
−τ
in with
exponent τ ≃ 3. However, on top of this background power law, there are significant
structures of peaks. The peaks are highest at the shortest interval ∆t = 1 sec and
they gradually vanish when ∆t increases. The most interesting fact is that the
positions of the peaks are at integer multiples of 25, the highest ones being at
Nin = 25 and Nin = 100. This is clearly due to large-scale sellers which place large
chunks of auctions at one moment (within one second). More detailed view shows
that for ∆t = 1 s the peaks at 50 and 75 are smaller than those at 25 and 100,
while for ∆t = 100 s these four peaks are of comparable weight, if measured with
respect to the background power law, and also the peaks at multiples of 100 are
more pronounced than in the distribution corresponding to ∆t = 1 s. This means
that there are sellers who put several chunks of sizes 25, or 100 not exactly at the
same second, but still not farther than about one minute.
In the distribution P (Nin), as shown in Fig. 7, we mix sellers who act with
different intensity. We have already seen the distribution of the average distances
between auctions in Fig. 1. In order to take into account the observed heterogeneity
in average distance between auctions, we modify the statistics defined by (4) so
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that the time span of seller a is divided into intervals of length ∆t = k〈T 〉a, i.
e. tl,a = Tmin,a + lk〈T 〉a. The results are shown in Fig. 8. Again, we can observe
the power-law tail with exponent close to τ ≃ 3, but a peak develops at the value
Nin,rel = k, as should be expected, because k is exactly the average value for the
number of auctions within the interval ∆t = k〈T 〉a, for every a. The exponent of the
power-law tail seems to decrease when k increases, but the power-law dependence
is still visible. We can conclude that the power-law tail with exponent τ ≃ 3 is due
to intrinsic structure of the time series, rather than heterogeneity of the average
time scales. Therefore, the noise induced by the activity of the individual agents is
itself complex.
4. Conclusions
We performed analysis of complex structure of activity in on-line auctions. For each
individual seller, we looked at the time series of the auctions she initiated. The basic,
though naturally expected, fact is that the set of sellers is very heterogeneous. The
average distance between auctions of the same seller varies from seconds to hundreds
of days.
The distribution of distances between subsequent auctions of the same seller
exhibits fundamental power-law decay on the scale from 1 minute to 1 day, with
exponent ≃ 1.5. On top of this power-law, there are peaks at natural units of time,
like one minute or multiples of 5 minutes.
We tested the signs of fractality in the time series of auctions. Although each
series is unique, the common features can be identified. We must note in advance
that the word “fractality” is somewhat abused here, as we always talk on fractal
properties within a limited range of scales. By the box counting method, we found
that beyond the scale of one day, the series are uniform, i. e. their fractal dimension
is 1. On the other end of the scales, for times shorter than about 30 seconds the
series appears as a set of isolated points, since the measured fractal dimension is 0.
In the intermediate range, from 30 sec to 1 day, self-similar structure is observed,
with fractal dimension ≃ 0.25. Note, however, that these measurements describe
averaged properties of the time series, but individual time series may deviate from
this mean behavior. Indeed, we observed individual time series with clear fractal
shape, and others, in which just two typical scales were observed, without signs of
fractality.
From the other side, we found the statistics of number of auctions within an
interval of fixed length. This length was either equal for all sellers, or a fixed multiple
of average distance between auctions, i. e. different for each seller. In both cases we
observed a power-law tail with exponent ≃ 3, just the value at the border between
Le´vy stable and Gaussian distributions. So, the tail is not due to heterogeneity of
the set of sellers, but due to the dynamics of each seller separately.
In all the analyses we observed complex patterns of noise in the placement of
auctions by individual sellers. There is power-law statistics in the waiting times
October 16, 2018 6:13 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE slanina140113
Slanina 11
between actions of the agents, there is power law in the statistics of cumulative
activity of an agent over fixed time interval. We may speculate on the consequences
of these findings for possible modeling of the behavior of agents in, for example,
stock markets. If the agents issued orders to buy or sell shares, rather than placed
auctions, the cumulative effect of the power-law distributed numbers of orders would
be a power law slowly converging to a Gaussian, which is just the general view of
how the statistic of stock market price changes looks like.
Finally, let us mention that similar study of buyer behavior was done. The results
seem to be fairly similar, which is probably due to the fact that content and timing
of the auctions is entirely in hands of the sellers and the buyers just follow what
they could. More subtle differences between the sellers’ and buyers’ side and their
possible synchronization will be investigated in a future study.
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